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Objective: The 2010 healthcare reform in England
introduced primary care-led commissioning in the
National Health Service (NHS) by establishing clinical
commissioning groups (CCGs). A key factor for the
success of the reform is the provision of excellent
commissioning support services to CCGs. The
Government’s aim is to create a vibrant market of
competing providers of such services (from both for-
profit and not-for-profit sectors). Until this market
develops, however, commissioning support units
(CSUs) have been created from which CCGs are buying
commissioning support functions. This study explored
the attitudes of CCGs towards outsourcing
commissioning support functions during the initial
stage of the reform.
Design: The research took place between September
2011 and June 2012. We used a case study research
design in eight CCGs, conducting in-depth interviews,
observation of meetings and analysis of policy
documents.
Setting/participants: We conducted 96 interviews
and observed 146 meetings (a total of approximately
439 h).
Results: Many CCGs were reluctant to outsource core
commissioning support functions (such as
contracting) for fear of losing local knowledge and
trusted relationships. Others were disappointed by the
absence of choice and saw CSUs as monopolies and a
recreation of the abolished PCTs. Many expressed
doubts about the expectation that outsourcing of
commissioning support functions will result in lower
administrative costs.
Conclusions: Given the nature of healthcare
commissioning, outsourcing vital commissioning
support functions may not be the preferred option of
CCGs. Considerations of high transaction costs, and
the risk of fragmentation of services and loss of
trusted relationships involved in short-term contracting,
may lead most CCGs to decide to form long-term
partnerships with commissioning support suppliers in
the future. This option, however, limits competition by
creating ‘network closure’ and calls into question the
Government’s intention to create a vibrant market of
commissioning support provision.
INTRODUCTION
The National Health Service (NHS) was
established in the UK in 1948 to provide uni-
versal healthcare coverage, free at the point
of delivery and funded out of general tax-
ation. Since then, it has been subject to
many restructurings and varying levels of
funding. In 2010, the Conservative-Liberal
Democrat coalition government embarked
on a large scale organisational overhaul of
the NHS in England, intended to cut the
costs of bureaucracy by more than 45% and
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This is the first study which discusses attitudes
of clinical commissioning groups (CCGs)
towards commissioning support provision.
▪ Evidence was gathered from eight case studies
across England selected to provide geographical
spread and a good mix of emerging models of
CCGs.
▪ Evidence from in-depth interviews was supple-
mented with observation of a variety of meetings
and analysis of relevant documents.
▪ Although the findings reported are from the early
phase of clinical support provision, evidence
from ongoing research on the development of
clinical commissioning groups indicates that the
arguments for and against outsourcing commis-
sioning support functions are still relevant.
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achieve productivity improvements of £20 billion by
2015.1 This reorganisation took place only in England
rather than the whole of the UK, as Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland have devolved healthcare systems.
Since the early 1990s, public policy analysts have been
drawing attention to the rise of the ‘contract state’, ‘gov-
ernment by contract’, or ‘contractual governance’.2–4
These terms are closely related to what is known in the
literature as new public management (NPM), a short-
hand description of the importation of management
techniques from the private into the public sector and
the use of market forces such as competition and con-
tract as a way of increasing efficiency and choice in the
delivery of public services.5–7 In the UK healthcare
sector, NPM started with the introduction of ‘manager-
ialism’ in hospitals in the early 1980s.8 This was followed
in the early 1990s by the introduction of the ‘quasi’ or
‘internal’ market involving a split between purchaser
and provider.9 10 Faithful to the NPM belief that markets
rather than bureaucracies are more likely to achieve effi-
ciency, the reorganisation of 2010 emphasised the use of
more competition, private sector involvement and
contracting.
One major focus of the 2010 restructuring is the func-
tion of commissioning, which includes assessing local
health needs, prioritising the allocation of resources, pro-
curing and purchasing healthcare services, and monitor-
ing contracts. Until April 2013, the state allocated funds
to primary care trusts (PCTs) which were charged with
commissioning primary, community and secondary care
services. Arguing that general practitioners (GPs), as the
gatekeepers of healthcare provision, should be in charge
of commissioning, the Coalition Government made GPs
responsible for commissioning most non-specialist sec-
ondary care, community and mental health services. In
April 2013 the managerially-led PCTs were replaced by
clinically-led clinical commissioning groups (CCGs).11
Commissioning healthcare requires highly specialised
skills and resources. The new Labour government
(1997–2010) had encouraged PCTs to buy in necessary
specialist external support from the private sector.12 13 A
subsequent House of Commons Health Committee,
however, raised concerns about the value for money
these arrangements offered, especially in the context of
the economic downturn.14
The Coalition Government announced that CCGs
would have access to a wide range of commissioning
support expertise, with the 2010 White Paper suggesting
that CCGs would be free to decide for themselves how
to obtain commissioning support, choosing suppliers
from an emerging market.15 In reality, however, their
options were heavily circumscribed. Contrary to policy
rhetoric, a market in commissioning support provision
was slow to emerge, which left CCGs with fewer
choices.16 17 In addition, soon after the introduction of
the reforms, many CCGs expressed uncertainty and
unease about outsourcing commissioning support ser-
vices, fearing that valuable local knowledge and trusted
relationships would be lost.18 CCG reluctance to out-
source commissioning support services meant that pol-
icymakers were forced to adapt policy plans, with new
guidance issued in 2012.19 20 Of all the pieces of the
health reform jigsaw puzzle, commissioning support
arrangements would seem to have fitted least easily into
place. This paper discusses the attitude of CCGs towards
commissioning support provision by using data from a
project which explored the early development of CCGs.
The main aim of the study as a whole was to examine
the early experiences and challenges faced by CCGs
(including putting in place adequate commissioning
support provision) as they set themselves up and moved
towards authorisation. Commissioning support emerged
as a key issue in all of our sites, and in this paper we
focus on this evidence, seeking to answer the following
questions:
▸ How did CCGs react to the idea of buying in commis-
sioning support?
▸ What factors affected their choices?
▸ What lessons can be learned for their future commis-
sioning support needs?
DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE OF COMMISSIONING
SUPPORT UNITS
The process and conduct of the 2010 NHS reforms have
been described in detail elsewhere. For a summary, see
the full project report.21 By April 2013, a total of 211
CCGs had been authorised and took over responsibility
for commissioning.
Early guidance suggested that CCGs would be able to
choose how to carry out their commissioning responsi-
bilities, including buying in commissioning support
from external providers such as local authorities, private
companies and ‘third sector’ organisations.22 In late
2011, however, as it became apparent that a marketplace
of commissioning support providers was slow to develop,
the Government established commissioning support
units (CSUs), staffed by former PCT commissioning
managers and intended to remain within the public
sector until April 2016.19 20 CSUs developed into large
regional organisations, seeking to maximise economies
of scale by providing services to many CCGs. The ser-
vices they could potentially provide range from business
support (eg, financial planning, Human Resources, IT)
to support with the commissioning cycle (eg, health
needs assessment, clinical pathway redesign, healthcare
procurement, contract negotiation and management,
data management, business intelligence) to clinical
support (eg, medicines management, continuing care,
complex case management). Although CCGs have been
firmly in place since April 2013, commissioning support
provision (including CSUs) is still in a state of flux. By
January 2014, the 23 CSUs originally approved were
reduced to 17 as a result of mergers. This number is
likely to be reduced further as more mergers were
announced at the time of writing.23
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At the beginning of 2014, NHS England announced
plans to ‘externalise’ or make CSUs independent from
the NHS. ‘Based on feedback from extensive engage-
ment with stakeholders,’ four potential organisational
forms for CSUs were identified24:
1. Social enterprise (taking the legal form of a commu-
nity interest company limited by guarantee)
2. Staff mutual, which will abide by the seven principles
of the cooperative movement (taking the legal form
of an industrial and provident society)
3. Customer controlled social enterprise, which would
be akin to the in-house department of the customers
(taking the legal form of a community interest
company limited by guarantee)
4. Joint venture, which would be formed by bringing in
other parties in order to raise the value for money
and quality of the CSU’s services (taking the legal
form of a company limited by shares)
The option of retaining CSUs within the public sector
was rejected, as was the option of transferring CSUs fully
to private providers. According to NHS England, the
approach taken about the future of CSUs represents the
right balance between making them autonomous while
at the same time protecting the public interest.24
MAKE, BUY, ALLY
Whatever the form of CSUs, CCGs have, broadly speak-
ing, three options when it comes to choosing commis-
sioning support provision: ‘make, buy, or ally’.25 26
Specifically, one option is to keep most commissioning
expertise in-house (make), buying in additional short-
term support from external providers ad hoc. However,
CCGs have been provided with a relatively small allow-
ance to pay their running and managerial costs,27 so this
is not a viable option for most groups. Alternatively, they
can outsource most of the commissioning support func-
tions, either through short-term contracts and frequent
testing of the market (buy) or through long-term part-
nerships with commissioning support providers (ally).
The decision will depend on factors such as the size of
their organisation and the availability of market
competition.28 29
Although the public sector has always bought products
from the private sector through public procurement and
supply chain management (SCM), the provision of
public services through contracting out has intensified
since the introduction of market reforms.28 30–34 SCM
theories have been applied specifically to the healthcare
sector but they have so far focused on the US model
rather than the English NHS.35 The recent policy
reforms, however, make the public procurement litera-
ture more relevant to NHS commissioning. Buying in
external support will inevitably create a more complex
picture, as CCGs deciding to outsource commissioning
support will enter into contracts with commissioning
support providers, who will in turn be managing con-
tracts with healthcare providers on behalf of their clients
(ie, CCGs). An additional layer of contract monitoring
will therefore be required, since an additional
‘principal-agent’ relationship is being created. This new
layer of contracting may magnify the problems already
associated with contract monitoring in healthcare.36–39
Deciding whether to make or buy is not easy. If organi-
sations provide services in-house (‘make’), transaction
costs are thought to be kept low compared to contract-
ing out, because there are fewer incentives for opportun-
istic behaviour and therefore less need for
comprehensive (and expensive) monitoring of out-
comes. On the other hand, there are some drawbacks,
such as the possibilities of missing out on competitive
prices, economies of scale, specialist expertise and
opportunities for switching between suppliers in case of
non-performance.40 Subcontracting through competitive
tendering mitigates these risks by enabling choice from
a wide variety of competing providers. However, in such
contracts the incentives for purchaser and provider are
not necessarily aligned, producing a potential loss of
service quality. For example, the supplier may comprom-
ise the quality of the product in order to secure the con-
tract by lowering costs. Mitigating this risk involves
expensive contract monitoring processes.41
A possible solution to this problem would be to put in
place longer-term contracts (eg, 3 years) characterised
by relations of trust and aligned incentives. Such a
model has been described in the literature as ‘supplier
partnership’, ‘partnership sourcing’40 42 or ‘alliancing’.43
This model suggests forming alliances with a single sup-
plier on the basis of a long-term relationship of loyalty,
cooperation and trust. The ‘customer-controlled social
enterprise’ and the ‘joint-venture’ options for CSUs can
be seen as being different examples of this model.
Within such partnerships the supplier works closely with
the purchaser towards continuous product develop-
ment.40 Advocates claim that such partnerships generate
close working relationships within ‘networks’,44 which
are claimed to be ‘“lighter on their feet” than hierarch-
ies’, with gains available from the pooling of resources.45
Furthermore, such long-term partnerships reduce the
risk of opportunistic behaviour by suppliers, as both
parties invest in shared long term goals and develop
trust.46 47 Many policy analysts, however, have also high-
lighted limitations of a network form of governance, sug-
gesting such organisational forms are prone to power
asymmetries, a leadership deficit and the potential onset
of dependencies and rigidities.48–50 Others caution
against the ‘dark side’ of supplier partnerships, warning
that they may easily result in a lack of flexibility in adapt-
ing to changing environments, thus adversely affecting
their performance.51 Too much trust on the part of the
buyer may lead to lack of vigilance in monitoring per-
formance, which can in turn result in complacency and
lower standards. It seems, then, that successful supplier
partnerships need both close collaboration between
buyer and supplier and a frequent reassessment of their
relationship. It is not easy to strike the right balance
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between frequently questioning the competence of the
supplier and maintaining a trusting relationship.
Establishing long-term public-private partnerships has
been a key theme of strategic public procurement in the
UK, but research suggests that such partnerships have
not been easy either to establish or to maintain, with
problems arising from cultural differences between
public and private sectors, budgetary constraints and dif-
fering attitudes to risk and innovation.31 34 Compared
with contracts operating in commercial markets, public
sector contracts in quasi markets such as the NHS are
subject to greater levels of public control, operating
within a hierarchical regulatory framework intended to
ensure the promotion of distributive justice and safe-
guard the public interest in addition to increasing effi-
ciency and choice.52
It is thus clear that the key assumption underpinning
recent changes to commissioning in the English NHS—
that a competitive market in outsourced commissioning
support will by definition be more efficient and effective
—cannot simply be taken for granted. It will be some
time before we can definitively assess the new arrange-
ments, but it is valuable to explore the emerging land-
scape at this early stage in order to provide evidence to
inform the ongoing development of commissioning
support services.
METHODS
This paper uses evidence from a national study of emer-
ging CCGs which was funded by the Policy Research
Unit, Department of Health. The research took place
between September 2011 and June 2012. Our methods
are described in full in the project report.21 A case study
research design with eight in-depth case studies was sup-
plemented by descriptive information from two web
surveys (one conducted in December 2011 and the
other in April 2012). Case study sites were selected to
provide a maximum variety sample across a number of
domains, including: size; sociodemographic profile; pres-
ence/absence of formal federation between CCGs; the
number of main providers with which the CCG inter-
acted; the number of Local Authorities with which the
CCG interacted; and how far the CCG represented the
recreation of a previous administrative grouping.
We conducted 96 interviews with a variety of CCG staff
(NHS managers, GPs, lay members and practice man-
agers). Interviews were recorded and transcribed after
obtaining written consent from participants. We
observed 146 meetings (a total of approximately 439 h),
including: governing body meetings; executive or oper-
ational group meetings; meetings of GP members; and
locality meetings. Researchers recorded detailed field
notes during meetings, and these were analysed along-
side the interview data.
This approach enabled us to move beyond the per-
sonal viewpoints of our interviewees to also observe what
actually happened in practice as the developing groups
wrestled with the complex situation that they faced. We
take the view that interview data alone are insufficient to
illuminate complex questions such as this. We therefore
combined exploration of the research questions in inter-
views with ethnographic observation of meetings at
which commissioning support was discussed, and exam-
ined documents produced by our case study sites as well
as national policy documents. While this could legitim-
ately be called ‘triangulation’, we regard it as an oppor-
tunity to develop and refine our findings, rather than as
a simplistic test of validity. Data from all sources were
stored and managed with the assistance of Atlas.ti soft-
ware, providing a medium through which research team
members were able to work together on the analysis.
Transcripts and fieldnotes were read repeatedly for
familiarisation, and coded using a framework based on
our research questions, our knowledge of the literature
in this area and from our reading of relevant policy
documents. In addition, inductive coding allowed us to
capture unexpected themes. Frequent team meetings
were held, at which coding definitions and emerging
theoretical ideas were discussed and refined. In add-
ition, the team produced and updated ongoing summar-
ies of the case study sites under headings derived from
the developing analytical framework, and these were dis-
cussed at the team meetings. This allowed us to maintain
ongoing cross-case comparisons, and aided in the hand-
ling of such large amounts of data. Emerging analytical
ideas were set out in written memos, and these were
tested among the research team members and refined.
Coded data were then further read and analysed by a
number of team members in order to ensure consist-
ency of approach, and the PI repeatedly read the whole
data set in order to further refine and develop the emer-
ging analysis.
FINDINGS
For CCGs, the most pressing question was deciding
whether to ‘make or buy’ commissioning support func-
tions. It is important to note here that the option of
‘ally’ was not considered by CCGs at the time of the
research, since the uncertainty surrounding the future
of CSUs made difficult the negotiation of longer term
contracts. In addition to the ‘make or buy’ options,
CCGs could establish federated structures by pooling
managerial resources and sharing commissioning
support (CS) provision.
Some of the dilemmas CCGs faced at this time were
due to uncertainty about policy expectations and the
sheer novelty of the reforms. As already mentioned,
while CCGs were preparing their applications for
‘authorisation’, CSUs were also going through a process
of assurance. One of the problems facing CCGs was the
fact that, as new organisations, they had not had time to
become ‘informed customers’ and they also lacked
detailed knowledge of their requirements. Since neither
CCGs nor CSUs had established themselves as
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organisations, a ‘chicken and egg’ problem was appar-
ent: CSUs were expecting CCGs to tell them what func-
tions they wanted to commission, while CCGs were
expecting the CSUs to tell them what services they
offered. One participant summarised the uncertain situ-
ation in which CCG found themselves:
We are nowhere ready to go out to some kind of com-
petitive procurement of these services, because we can’t
even articulate what we want, never mind how much it
should cost, or who else is out there who can supply it.
Because the other thing which is true of course is there
is no market place. We couldn’t buy this if we wanted to
because it doesn’t exist. [Manager ID 244]
Despite initial government rhetoric and enthusiasm
about the choices opened to CCGs by a competitive
market in commissioning support, CCGs soon discov-
ered that the only game in town was some version of
amalgamation of former PCTs.
Make, buy or share?
A number of issues highlighted by participants were
more general and related not so much to the timing as
to the nature of the changes. Many discussions across
the study sites focused on deciding which commission-
ing support functions should be retained in-house,
which should be contracted out and which should be
shared with other CCGs.
Make
CCGs have been provided with a limited managerial
budget of £25 per capita (which totals significantly less
than the average running cost of their predecessor orga-
nisations). Many participants told us that their initial
intention was to employ most of the commissioning staff
in-house, but this decision had to be revisited once the
managerial budgets were announced.
…part of the reason why we still haven’t worked all this
out yet, is because we thought that as a large CCG we’d be
doing a lot of this in-house anyway, so it came to us fairly
late in the day that we would have to start thinking about
externalisation of, of a lot of this. [Manager, ID 171]
One of our larger sites decided to keep the CS func-
tions in-house. One reason for this was the absence of a
developed market in CS services but additional argu-
ments were also important. First, members of the CCG
were concerned that they would lose trusted local man-
agerial personnel. Participants highlighted the import-
ance of relationships and the sense of ‘knowing who you
are dealing with’, being in control rather than having to
interact with a remote regional provider. One partici-
pant at a different site expressed concerns about this:
‘It’s going to become more and more difficult, it’s going to
be more and more lengthy to get things done, I think.
Because you don’t have that shorthand. [you can’t just pick
up a phone and say] ‘Hi, so and so, you know you did
that?’ ‘Can I have a word’ You know? It’s not going to be
like that, it’s going to be fill in a form, or you speak to some-
body you might even never have met. [Manager ID 122]
A second reason, repeated by several CCGs, was the
importance of detailed knowledge about unique local
problems and the difficulty of interpreting generic data
produced by a distant CS provider in the absence of
local knowledge.
If we buy in a performance system from...could be any-
where...they don’t have the ability to interpret what that
intelligence says, and I think if you don’t have that local
interpretation...I think you’re gonna lose the richness of
the information, however slick it is.’ [Manager ID 196]
But even the CCG that decided to retain most of the
commissioning support functions in-house made it clear
that they would keep an open mind and review the pro-
vision of those functions on a regular basis retaining the
flexibility of outsourcing them at a later stage.
But the caveat that the measures envisaged would include
is, say, that isn’t a licence that there’ll be no further
changes, and that there will be an opportunity to review
on an annual basis the appropriate functionality of the
commissioning support of the CCG.’ [Manager ID 63]
As the literature shows, however, constantly checking
for alternative providers can create feelings of uncer-
tainty and anxiety in existing personnel. One participant
mentioned the need to strike the right balance:
Because if every year they [CCGs] market test 20% of
their services and outsource 10% of it, as soon as you tell
the staff that we’re market testing your area they know
that there’s a one in two, or 50–50, whether or not they’ll
have a job after it. So you introduce ambiguity and
anxiety when you’ve just gone through all of that...There
is a balance to be struck but...it’s incumbent on the com-
missioning support staff to deliver the best for the CCG,
because in that lies the security of continuing employ-
ment. [Manager ID 63]
This suggests that the fear of losing out to a competi-
tor may be sufficient to prevent complacency on the
part of in-house providers.
Buy
Deciding to provide all commissioning support in-house
was the exception in our case studies, and in the country
as a whole. Large CCGs had the resources to have CS func-
tions in-house but for smaller CCGs outsourcing was the
only option, although many also planned to employ a
small core staff in-house. In the absence of a market
including private providers, CCGs looked to the emerging
regional CSUs. Participants expressed a mixture of views
on this development. Many were reluctant to outsource all
CS functions for fear of losing control and ownership of
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the process as well as losing ‘collective memory and experi-
ence’. Others felt that they were being forced to outsource
by top-down policy expectations.
We certainly planned to have a lot of our staff employed
in the CCG, and, that’s not going to be the case…We
have spent a lot of time building up local relationships in
the localities, and bringing people in from elsewhere just
isn’t the same …That’s the policy, we have to work with it
and make the best of it, but it would have been better if
we could have had more staff …working with us directly.
[Manager ID 193]
Yet others were excited at the prospect of being able
to shop around for CS providers rather than being
dependent on the limited skills offered by PCTs. Instead
of being ‘stuck’ with a CSU which might look like the
old PCT, some participants welcomed the freedom to
‘pick and choose’ rather than buy all their CS functions
from the same provider.
Some of the conversations I have with my colleagues, it’s
like...some of them can’t wait to free themselves from the
PCT and I say, but surely, this is an opportunity to make
this work, not go into it thinking it’s going to fail and I
can’t wait to go in contract with McKinseys or something.
[Manager ID 114]
Some participants were unhappy with the creation of
regional CSUs because they thought it created monop-
olies and restricted choice.
We’re now back to a place where in fact what we’re trying
to do is to build massive shared service organisations
involving hundreds of people covering very large areas in
a way which won’t give the customers any choice at all,
they’re monopolies. [Manager ID 244]
The CCGs that did outsource to CSUs were careful to
avoid long-term contracts in order to maintain flexibility
to switch provider when the market matured.
Most participants were willing to unbundle some CS
functions but they also insisted on keeping in-house
what they considered to be core functions. There was,
however, a great variety of opinions about which CS
functions should be considered as ‘core’ and which were
appropriate for outsourcing. Some participants, for
example, thought that financial management needed to
be provided in-house but others believed it could be out-
sourced. Some CCGs deemed that functions like negoti-
ating and monitoring contracts with heath care
providers could be easily outsourced. Others thought
that, because of the complexity and the importance of
building good relationships with local providers, contract
negotiation and monitoring should be kept in-house.
Acute contracts are notoriously complex, and I think at
the moment …how people perceive contracting, they
think it’s quite an automated process. That it’s like you go
to the supermarket, you buy a tin of beans … you put it
through the till and out pops the bill sort of thing. It isn’t
like that in the NHS…I’m willing to work with let’s have it
at an arm’s length in terms of a CSU, and there might be
some economies of scale …, but if we start losing any
expertise or that closeness, because you need to work very
closely with people in contracting, then I’ll have to say no,
it isn’t going to happen. [Manager ID 287]
A distinction was also made between ‘relational’ and
‘transactional’ types of CS functions. The data analysis
that supports contracting was cited as an example of a
transactional function which could be outsourced easily,
while contract negotiation was cited as a relational func-
tion which had to be kept in-house. Some participants
believed that the design of pathways is ‘fairly transac-
tional’ and could therefore be outsourced but others had
serious misgivings about the ability of remote external
suppliers to redesign clinical pathways in the absence of
local knowledge. Others again thought that generic clin-
ical pathways could be designed but then they would have
to be adapted to local conditions. There was widespread
agreement among participants that ‘back office’ support
functions could be outsourced, but such functions had
already been outsourced by many PCTs.
Owing to CCGs being left with small managerial
teams, participants stressed the need for CS providers to
produce CCG-specific information.
Many CCGs in our case studies understood the ration-
ale for creating economies of scale but emphasised the
importance of maintaining good relationships and clear
lines of accountability between CS providers and CCGs.
They also stressed the need for an additional layer of
monitoring the performance of CS providers and the
associated increase in transaction costs.
You have to know that what you’re getting from any com-
missioning support organisation is robust and correct. So
that you end up pulling a whole bunch of people to
check what they’re doing is the right thing, or do you
just employ the people and check them yourself? I think
we’re struggling a bit with that at the moment …Who’s
checking how many knee operations the provider is char-
ging us for? And you have somebody checking the
person who’s checking how many. [GP ID 283]
Many CCGs questioned the wisdom of the reforms
and in particular the idea that they would result in effi-
ciency gains. Several participants doubted that outsour-
cing CS functions to centralised and remote CSUs would
necessarily save money, because of the associated dupli-
cation of work.
I know the push from on high is sort of, you know, buy it
in from a large national organisation but actually it’s not
always cheaper to do it that way. I mean, if it’s too
remote, you end up reinventing it within your locality
because you don’t trust the organisations providing … So
we’re employing someone to check what they’re doing is
right and you don’t always get the economies of scale if
you make it too remote. [GP ID 282]
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Many CCGs feared that the new structures would not
be affordable, given the limited financial resources allo-
cated to CCGs for management support.
Share
The issue of limited resources led smaller CCGs to col-
laboration. Instead of contracting out most CS functions
to a regional provider, smaller CCGs selected the
sharing option for the delivery of core commissioning
support functions. Keen to keep vital CS functions
in-house, a few CCGs in geographic proximity to each
other agreed to share key commissioning support per-
sonnel, reducing thereby their overall management
costs. Some CCGs were also exploring the option of
sharing commissioning support with their local author-
ity. This meant that,
We get the local knowledge but we’re reducing the over-
heads so it actually may be a more cost effective way to
share with the local authority and other CCGs than go to
a national or regional model. [GP ID 282]
This fits in with the national direction of creating
economies of scale but it also allows the cooperating
CCGs to keep the functions local and maintain control.
DISCUSSION
The picture of commissioning support provision is still
developing. The preferred model so far has been a ‘hub
and spoke’ formation in which large regional CSUs
provide services to a number of CCGs. The policy plan
is that by the end of 2016 CSUs will become autono-
mous entities in order to be able to compete in a devel-
oping market for CS provision. It is likely that CSUs will
become even larger entities as a way of securing their
viability. A wave of mergers is already underway.53 At the
same time, there are signs that CCGs are becoming
increasingly unhappy about contracting out vital CS
functions to CSUs and are transferring them back
in-house.54 55 Fragmentation of services and lack of
quality and value for money are reported to be some of
the reasons for this move.
The new structures are meant to increase cost effect-
iveness by creating economies of scale. Whether they
really are more cost effective than the old arrangements,
however, is not yet known and the issue will need to be
subjected to economic evaluation, which is beyond the
scope of this paper. NHS England are currently under-
taking an impact assessment of CSU autonomisation
which is expected to be published in late 2014.56
Recently, public policy analysts have questioned claims
that the adoption of NPM approaches brings about sig-
nificant administrative savings.57 Transaction cost theor-
ists draw attention to high costs of contract
monitoring.58 Models which rest on short-term competi-
tive tendering may be less efficient (because of high
transaction costs) than models promoting social capital
and relationships of trust and reciprocity. On the other
hand, integrationist models promoting social capital and
trust may prove equally, if not more, inefficient because
they result in monopolies, higher prices and a lack of
quality improvement.
Respondents in our case studies expressed both these
views. Some seemed happy at the prospect of choosing
commissioning support functions from a range of com-
peting providers and were disappointed when they dis-
covered that, at least for the first few years, they had to
obtain commissioning support from regional CSUs.
They felt that CSUs were a form of monopoly. On the
other hand, many sites were worried about opening
commissioning support functions to competition and
saw this as part of a Government plan to privatise the
NHS. Several participants also feared that remote com-
missioning support providers would find it difficult to
understand distinct local issues, especially in large rural
areas. The majority of participants, however, adopted a
more balanced view, according to which there was room
for a market in commissioning support functions as long
as it allowed CCGs to make their own choices about
which functions to externalise. Most participants felt
that a number of ‘core’ functions had to be provided
in-house. There was, however, lack of agreement about
which functions were ‘core’ and which could be
externalised.
Importantly, some participants drew a distinction
between ‘transactional’ and ‘relational’ commissioning
functions and expressed a variety of views either about
their definition or about their suitability for outsourcing.
NHS England draws the distinction between ‘transform-
ational’ (eg, service or pathway re-design) and ‘transac-
tional’ (eg, market management, healthcare
procurement, contract negotiation and monitoring,
information analysis) commissioning functions, but
emphasises that commissioning support providers ought
to be used by CCGs to drive strategic or transformational
change rather than merely to deliver the transactional
functions.19 Some participants, as we saw, were happy
with the creation of national pathways but feared that
important local knowledge might be lost. For reasons pre-
dicted by the outsourcing literature, many participants
felt uncomfortable about outsourcing core commission-
ing support functions (eg, contract negotiation and mon-
itoring) but were at ease with the idea of outsourcing the
transactional type of commissioning functions, like busi-
ness intelligence and data management.
In addition, CCGs expressed concerns about outsour-
cing commissioning support functions in general. One
important issue is the monitoring of commissioning
support providers. At the time of writing, NHS England
is overseeing the new commissioning structures, includ-
ing the development of the procurement skills of com-
missioners and a ‘lead provider framework’ of
accredited CS providers (including CSUs). Even now,
however, it is not clear who is responsible for monitoring
the work of CSUs. It is even less clear who will be moni-
toring the commissioning support providers after 2016
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when the market is opened up to the private and volun-
tary sectors. One of the stated aims of the reforms is the
creation of more transparency and accountability in the
NHS.15 Under the new structures, CCGs are accountable
to NHS England but the lines of accountability between
CCGs and other organisations, including commissioning
support providers, are far less clear.59 Commissioning
support providers will be ‘contractually’ accountable to
CCGs. But if CCGs lack the resources or skills to
monitor them properly then the sense in which they are
really accountable to CCGs becomes less obvious. A
further danger is that if CCGs lack the means to hold
commissioning support providers properly to account,
they may become dependent and led by them.
Another issue is whether CCGs will have the resources
or skills to scan the market regularly and keep up to
date with developments in commissioning support provi-
sion. Moreover, CCGs will face the dilemma of monitor-
ing the market at the risk of alienating their current
providers. It may not be easy to maintain a good
working relationship with commissioning support provi-
ders under these conditions. In order to develop truly
collaborative relationships, CCGs will have to put in
place longer term contracts characteristic of the partner-
ship type of outsourcing. Our discussion of the literature
shows that there are advantages to be had in selecting
this model. As we saw, however, this model is not free
from dangers, the most significant of which is the cre-
ation of exclusive networks or ‘network closure’. The
creation of long-term partnerships (rather than frequent
competitive contract tendering) may also call into ques-
tion the Government’s intention to create a vibrant
market for commissioning support provision.
Externalising commissioning support provision may yet
develop into one further NPM paradox.60 There is a
danger that elements of commissioning support which
might be delivered better through vertical integration or
regional collaboration (eg, contract management or
pathway developments), may in the end be externalised,
when this could entail the loss of vital relations and local
focus, damage to services, and a waste of resources.
CONCLUSION
This paper discussed the attitude of CCGs towards com-
missioning support provision during the initial stage of
their development. We witnessed a mixed reaction with
arguments for and against buying commissioning
support from external providers. Provision of commis-
sioning support is still very much an evolving theme in
the English NHS and further research needs to be con-
ducted on the issue. Our research highlighted a number
of questions that need to be addressed:
▸ Does buying commissioning support represent value
for money for CCGs?
▸ Given the limited resources of CCGs will they be able
to hold external commissioning support providers to
account?
▸ Will CCGs which externalise commissioning support
provision be able at the same time to maintain close
relationships with healthcare providers?
It remains to be seen whether more CCGs will opt to
keep commissioning support provision in-house or form
customer controlled social enterprises with CSUs.
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